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ASPIRATION LEARNING IN COORDINATION GAMES ∗
GEORGIOS C. CHASPARIS† , ARI ARAPOSTATHIS‡ , AND JEFF S. SHAMMA§
Abstract. We consider the problem of distributed convergence to efficient outcomes in coordination games
through dynamics based on aspiration learning. Under aspiration learning, a player continues to play an action
as long as the rewards received exceed a specified aspiration level. Here, the aspiration level is a fading memory
average of past rewards, and these levels also are subject to occasional random perturbations. A player becomes
dissatisfied whenever a received reward is less than the aspiration level, in which case the player experiments with a
probability proportional to the degree of dissatisfaction. Our first contribution is the characterization of the asymptotic
behavior of the induced Markov chain of the iterated process in terms of an equivalent finite-state Markov chain. We
then characterize explicitly the behavior of the proposed aspiration learning in a generalized version of coordination
games, examples of which include network formation and common-pool games. In particular, we show that in generic
coordination games the frequency at which an efficient action profile is played can be made arbitrarily large. Although
convergence to efficient outcomes is desirable, in several coordination games, such as common-pool games, attainability
of fair outcomes, i.e., sequences of plays at which players experience highly rewarding returns with the same frequency,
might also be of special interest. To this end, we demonstrate through analysis and simulations that aspiration learning
also establishes fair outcomes in all symmetric coordination games, including common-pool games.
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AMS subject classifications. 68T05, 91A26, 91A22, 93E35, 60J05, 91A80
1. Introduction. Distributed coordination is of particular interest in many engineering sys-
tems. Two examples are distributed overlay routing or network formation [6] and medium access
control [11] in wireless communications. In either case, nodes need to utilize their resources effi-
ciently so that a desirable global objective is achieved. For example, in network formation, nodes
need to choose their immediate links so that connectivity is achieved with a minimum possible com-
munication cost, i.e., minimum number of links. Similarly, in medium access control, users need
to establish a fair scheduling of accessing a shared communication channel so that collisions (i.e.,
situations at which two or more users access the common resource) are avoided. In these scenarios,
achieving coordination in a distributed and adaptive fashion to an efficient outcome is of special
interest.
The distributed yet coupled nature of these problems, combined with a desire for online adapta-
tion, motivates using models based on game theoretic learning [8,23,29]. In game theoretic learning,
each agent is endowed with a set of actions and a utility/reward function that depends on that
agent’s and other agents’ actions. Agents then learn which action to play based only on their own
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previous experience of the game (actions played and utilities received). A major challenge in this
setting is that explicit utility function optimization may be impractical. This may be due to inherent
complexity (e.g., a large number of players or actions), or the lack of any closed form expression for
the utility function. Rather, rewards can be measured online. In terms of game theoretic learning,
this eliminates adaptation based on an ability to compute a “best reply”. Another obstacle to utility
maximization is that from any agent’s perspective, the environment includes other adapting agents,
and hence is nonstationary. Consequently, actions that may have been effective in the past need not
continue to be effective.
Motivated by these issues, this paper considers a form of distributed learning dynamics known
as aspiration learning, where agents “satisfice” rather than “optimize”. The aspiration learning
scheme is based on a simple principle of “win-stay, lose-shift” [22], according to which a successful
action is repeated while an unsuccessful action is dropped. The success of an action is determined
by a simple comparison test of its performance with the player’s desirable return (aspiration level).
The aspiration level is updated to incorporate prior experience into the agent’s success criterion.
Through this learning scheme, agents learn to play their “best” action.
The history of aspiration learning schemes starts with the pioneering work of [25], where satis-
faction seeking behavior was used to explain social decision making. A simple aspiration learning
model is presented in [22], where games of two players and two actions are considered, and decisions
are taken based on the “win-stay, lose-shift” rule. In the special case of two-player/two-actionmutual
interest games and symmetric coordination games, respectively, references, [21] and [14] show that
the payoff-dominant action profile is selected with probability close to one. Similar are the results
in [5, 13]. However, contrary to [21] and [14], both models incorporate a small perturbation either
in the aspiration update [13] or in the action update [5].
Recent research efforts on equilibrium selection in games have focused on achieving distributed
convergence to Pareto-efficient payoff profiles, i.e., payoff profiles at which no action change can
make a player better off while not making some other player worse off. For example, reference [17]
introduced an aspiration learning algorithm that converges (in distribution) to action profiles that
maximize social welfare in multiple player games. Some key characteristics of this algorithm is
that agents keep track of their most recent satisfactory action and satisfactory payoff (benchmark
action and payoff), and they update their actions by following a “win-stay lose-shift” rule, where the
aspiration level is defined as the benchmark payoff. Convergence to the Pareto-efficient payoffs in
two player games also has been investigated by [2]. The learning algorithm considered in [2] has two
distinctive features: a) agents commit on playing a series of actions for a k-period interval, and b)
agents make decisions according to a “win-stay lose-shift” rule, where aspiration levels are computed
as the running average payoff over all the previous k-period intervals. It is shown that, in two player
games, the agents’ payoffs converge to a small neighborhood of the set of the Pareto-efficient payoffs
almost surely if k is sufficiently large.
In this paper, we also focus on achieving convergence to efficient payoff profiles (also part of
the Pareto-efficient payoff profiles) in coordination games of large number of players and actions.
Agents apply an aspiration learning scheme that is motivated by [13]. Our goal is to a) characterize
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explicitly the asymptotic behavior of the process for generic games of multiple players and actions,
and b) derive conditions under which efficient payoffs are selected in large coordination games. Our
main contribution is the characterization of the asymptotic behavior of the induced Markov chain
by means of the invariant distributions of an equivalent finite-state Markov chain, whenever the
experimentation probability becomes sufficiently small. This equivalence simplifies the analysis of
what would otherwise be an infinite state Markov process. These results extend prior analysis on
this type of aspiration learning schemes to games of multiple players and actions. We also specialize
the results for a class of games that is a generalized version of so-called coordination games. In
particular, we show that, in these games, the unique invariant distribution of the equivalent finite-
state Markov chain puts arbitrarily large weight on the payoff-dominant action profiles if the step
size of the aspiration-level update becomes sufficiently small. We finally demonstrate the utility
of the learning scheme to network formation games, which is of independent interest, since prior
learning schemes on network formation are primarily based on best-response dynamics, e.g., [3].
While convergence to payoff-dominant action profiles in coordination games is desirable, an-
other desirable property is a notion of fairness. In particular, for some coordination games where
coincidence of interests is not so strong, such as the Battle of the Sexes (cf., [20, Section 2.3]), con-
vergence to a single action profile might not be fair for all agents that would probably rather be
in a different action profile. Instead, an alternation between several action profiles might be more
desirable, usually described through distributions in the joint action space. An example of a class
of such coordination games is so-called common-pool games, where multiple users need to coordi-
nate on utilizing a limited common resource. The proposed aspiration learning algorithm also may
provide a distributed and adaptive approach for convergence to fair outcomes in such symmetric
coordination games, such as common-pool games. This property is of independent interest, since it
is relevant to several scenarios of distributed resource allocation, such as medium access control in
wireless communications [11].
In comparison to prior and other current work, this paper develops (and corrects) the specific
model of aspiration learning in [13] beyond two player games. The paper goes on to derive special-
ized results for coordination games involving convergence to efficient action profiles and fairness in
symmetric games. The results in [17] use a simpler finite state model of aspiration learning and are
applicable to almost all games. The results in [17] establish convergence to efficient action profiles,
but as yet do not specify selection/fairness among these action profiles. The model of [2] is more
closely related to the present model, but with a different definition of aspiration levels and a differ-
ent mechanism to perturb aspirations. The results of convergence to efficiency in [2] extend beyond
coordination games while requiring two player games and do not specify fairness/selection among
efficient profiles.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines coordination games
and presents two special cases of coordination games, namely network formation and common-
pool games. Section 3 presents the aspiration learning algorithm and its convergence properties in
games of multiple players and actions. Section 4 specializes the convergence analysis to coordination
games and establishes convergence to efficient outcomes. It also demonstrates the results through
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simulations in network formation games. Section 5 extends the convergence analysis to symmetric
coordination games and establishes conditions under which convergence to fair outcomes is also
established. Finally, Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
Terminology: We consider the standard setup of finite strategic-form games. There is a finite
set of agents or players, I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and each agent has a finite set of actions, denoted by Ai.
The set of action profiles is the Cartesian product A , A1 × · · · × An; αi ∈ Ai denotes an action
of agent i; and α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ A denotes the action profile or joint action of all agents. The
payoff/utility function of player i is a mapping ui : A → R. A strategic-form game, denoted G ,
consists of the sets I, A and the preference relation induced by the utility functions ui, i ∈ I. An
action profile α∗ ∈ A is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if
ui(α
∗
i , α
∗
−i) ≥ ui(α
′
i, α
∗
−i) (1.1)
for all i ∈ I and α′i ∈ Ai, where −i denotes the complementary set I \ {i}. We denote the set of
pure Nash equilibria by A∗. In case the inequality (1.1) is strict, the Nash equilibrium is called a
strict Nash equilibrium. For the remainder of the paper, the term “Nash equilibrium” always refers
to a “pure Nash equilibrium.”
2. Coordination Games.
2.1. Definitions. Before defining coordination games, we first need to define the notion of
better reply:
Definition 2.1 (Better reply). The better reply of agent i ∈ I to an action profile α =
(αi, α−i) ∈ A is a set valued map BRi : A → 2Ai such that for any α∗i ∈ BRi(α) we have
ui(α
∗
i , α−i) > ui(αi, α−i).
A coordination game is defined as follows:
Definition 2.2 (Coordination game). A game of two or more agents is a coordination game
if there exists A¯ ⊂ A such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) for any α¯ ∈ A¯ and α /∈ A¯,
ui(α¯) ≥ ui(α) for all i ∈ I , (2.1)
i.e., A¯ payoff-dominates A \ A¯ ;
(b) for any α ∈ A \ (A∗ ∪ A¯), there exist i ∈ I and action α′i ∈ BRi(α) such that
uj(α
′
i, α−i) ≥ uj(αi, α−i) for all j 6= i ; (2.2)
(c) for any α∗ ∈ A∗ \ A¯ (if non-empty), there exist an action profile α˜ ∈ A and a sequence of
distinct agents j1, . . . , jn−1 ∈ I, such that
ui
(
α˜j1 , . . . , α˜jℓ , α
∗
−{j1,...,jℓ}
)
< ui(α
∗)
for all i ∈ {j1, j2, . . . , jℓ+1}, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
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A strict coordination game refers to a coordination game with the inequality (2.1) being strict.
The conditions of a coordination game establish a weak form of “coincidence of interests” and
define a larger class of games than the ones traditionally considered as coordination games, e.g.,
[16, 27]. For example, according to [16], one of the conditions that a coordination game needs to
satisfy is that payoff differences among players at any action profile are much smaller than payoff
differences among different action profiles. This condition reflects a form of coincidence of interests.
Definition 2.2 (b) also establishes a similar form of coincidence of interests, but weaker in the sense
that it holds for at least one direction of action change.
Note also that existence of Nash equilibria is not necessary for a game to be a coordination game.
Furthermore, if A∗ ⊂ A¯, then Definition 2.2 can be written solely with respect to the desirable set
of profiles A¯. In that case, Definition 2.2 (c) becomes vacuous since A∗ \ A¯ = ∅.
A trivial example of a coordination game is the Stag-Hunt Game of Table 2.1.
A B
A 4, 4 0, 2
B 2, 0 3, 3
Table 2.1
The Stag-Hunt Game
First, there exists a payoff-dominant profile, namely (A,A), that can be identified as the desirable
set A¯, and satisfies Definition 2.2 (a). Also, from any action profile outside A∗∪A¯, namely (A,B) or
(B,A), there is a better reply that improves the payoff for all agents (i.e., Definition 2.2 (b) holds).
Lastly, for any Nash equilibrium profile outside A¯, i.e., (B,B), there is a player (row or column)
and an action which makes everyone worse off (i.e., Definition 2.2 (c) holds). Thus, the Stag-Hunt
game satisfies all the conditions of Definition 2.2.
Note finally that in some games, there might be multiple choices for the selection of the desirable
set A¯. For example, in the Stag-Hunt game of Table 2.1, an alternative selection of A¯ corresponds
to the union of the action profiles (A,A) and (B,B). In that case, both properties (a) and (b) of
Definition 2.2 hold, while property (c) is vacuous. In other words, the Stag-Hunt game is also a
coordination game with respect to the new selection of the desirable set A¯ .
Claim 2.1. In any coordination game and for any action profile α /∈ A∗ ∪ A¯ there exists a
sequence of action profiles {αk}, such that α0 = α and αki ∈ BRi(α
k−1) for some i, terminates at
an action profile in A∗ ∪ A¯ .
Proof. By Definition 2.2 (b) there exists an agent i ∈ I and an action α1i ∈ BRi(α
0), such that
ui
(
α1i , α
0
−i
)
> ui
(
α0i , α
0
−i
)
and us
(
α1i , α
0
−i
)
≥ us
(
α0i , α
0
−i
)
for all s 6= i . Define α1 , (α1i , α
0
−i).
Unless α1 ∈ A∗ ∪ A¯, we can repeat the same argument to generate an action profile α2 and so
on. Thus, we construct a sequence (α0, α1, α2, . . . ) along which the map α 7→
∑
i∈I ui(α) is strictly
monotone. However, since A is finite, the sequence must necessarily terminate at some αk ∈ A∗ ∪A¯
for k < |A|.
Note that when A¯ ⊆ A∗, then a direct consequence of Claim 2.1 is that coordination games are
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weakly acyclic games (cf., [29]).
2.2. Network Formation Games. Network formation games are of particular interest in
wireless communications due to their utility in modeling distributed topology control [24] and overlay
routing [6]. Recent developments in distributed learning dynamics, e.g., [4], have also provided the
tools for computing efficient solutions for these games in a distributed manner.
To illustrate how a network formation game can be modeled as a coordination game, we introduce
a simple network formation game motivated by [12]. Let us consider n nodes deployed on the
plane and assume that the set of actions of each agent i, Ai, contains all possible combinations
of neighbors of i, denoted Ni, with which a link can be established, i.e., Ai = 2Ni . Links are
considered unidirectional, and a link established by node i with node s, denoted (s, i), starts at s
with the arrowhead pointing to i. A graph G is defined as a collection of nodes and directed links.
Define also a path from s to i as a sequence of nodes and directed links that starts at s and ends to
i following the orientation of the graph, i.e.,
(s→ i) =
{
s = s0, (s0, s1), s1, . . . , (sm−1, sm), sm = i
}
for some positive integer m. In a connected graph, there is a path from any node to any other node.
Let us consider the utility function ui : A → R, i ∈ I, defined by
ui(α) ,
∑
s∈I\{i}
χα(s→ i)− c |αi| , (2.3)
where |αi| denotes the number of links corresponding to αi and c is a constant in (0, 1). Also,
χα(s→ i) ,

1 if (s→ i) ⊆ Gα ,0 otherwise,
where Gα denotes the graph induced by joint action α. The resulting Nash equilibria are usually
called Nash networks [3]. As it was shown in Proposition 4.2 in [4], a network G∗ is a Nash network
if and only if it is critically connected, i.e., i) it is connected, and ii) for any (s, i) ∈ G, (s → i)
is the unique path from s to i. For example, the resulting Nash networks for n = 3 agents and
unconstrained neighborhoods are shown in Fig. 2.1.
1
2 3
(a)
1
2 3
(b)
Fig. 2.1. Nash networks in case of n = 3 agents and 0 < c < 1.
Let us define A¯ to be the following set of action profiles
A¯ , {α∗ ∈ A : ui(α
∗) = max
α∈A
ui(α) for all i ∈ I} ,
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which corresponds to the set of payoff-dominant networks. Note that payoff-dominant networks (if
they exist) are connected with minimum number of links. Also, not all Nash networks are necessarily
payoff-dominant. For example, in Fig. 2.1(a), assuming that 0 < c < 1, all players realize the same
utility, which is equal to 2 − c. This is a strict Nash network since each agent can only be worse
off by unilaterally changing its links. It is also the payoff-dominant network. On the other hand,
Fig. 2.1(b) is a non-strict Nash network and is payoff-dominated by Fig. 2.1(a).
The utility function (2.3) corresponds to the connections model of [12] and has been used to
describe various economic and social contexts such as transmission of information. It has also
been applied for distributed topology control in wireless networks [15]. Practically, it constitutes a
measure of network connectivity, since the maximum utility for node i is achieved when there is a
path from any other node to i.
Claim 2.2. The network formation game defined by (2.3) is a coordination game, provided the
set of payoff-dominant networks is non-empty.
Proof. For a joint action α /∈ A∗ suppose that an agent i picks the best reply in BRi(α) 6= ∅
(i.e., the most profitable better reply). Then no other agent becomes worse off, since a best reply for
i always retains connectivity. Note that this is not necessarily true for any other better reply. Thus,
Definition 2.2 (b) is satisfied. In order to show property (c), consider any joint action α that is a
Nash network. If any one agent j1 selects the action α˜j1 of establishing “no links”, then there exists
at least one other agent j2 6= j1 whose payoff becomes strictly less than the equilibrium payoff (e.g.,
pick j2 such that (j1, j2) ∈ Gα). This is due to the fact that α is critically connected. Continue in
the same manner by selecting α˜j2 to be the action of establishing “no links”, and so on. This way,
we may construct a sequence of agents and an action profile which satisfies Definition 2.2 (c) of a
coordination game.
The condition that payoff-dominant networks exist is not restrictive. For example, if Ni = I\{i}
for all i, then the set of wheel networks (cf., [4]) is payoff dominant.
In a forthcoming section, we present a distributed optimization approach for achieving conver-
gence to payoff-dominant networks through aspiration learning which is of independent interest.
2.3. Common-Pool Games. Common-pool games refer to strategic interactions where two
or more agents need to decide unilaterally whether or not to utilize a limited common resource. In
such interactions, each agent would rather use the common resource by itself than share it with
another agent, which is usually penalizing for both.
We define common-pool games as follows:
Definition 2.3 (Common-Pool Game). A common-pool game is a strategic-form game such
that for each agent i ∈ I, Ai = {p0, p1, . . . , pm−1}, with 0 ≤ p0 < p1 < · · · < pm−1, and
ui(α) ,


1− cj , if αi = pj and αi > maxℓ 6=i αℓ ,
−cj + τj , if αi = pj and ∃s ∈ I \ {i} s.t. αs > maxℓ 6=s αℓ ,
−cj , if αi = pj and ∄s ∈ I s.t. αs > maxℓ 6=s αℓ ,
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where 0 ≤ c0 < · · · < cm−1 < 1, τj > 0 for all j = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 2, and
−c0 < −cm−1 + τm−1 < · · · < −c0 + τ0 < 1− cm−1 .
This definition of a common-pool game can be viewed as a finite-action analog of continuous-
action common-pool games defined in [19]. Table 2.2 presents an example of a common-pool game
of 2 players and 3 actions.
p0 p1 p2
p0 −c0,−c0 −c0 + τ0, 1− c1 −c0 + τ0, 1− c2
p1 1− c1,−c0 + τ0 −c1,−c1 −c1 + τ1, 1− c2
p2 1− c2,−c0 + τ0 1− c2,−c1 + τ1 −c2,−c2
Table 2.2
A common-pool game of 2 players and 3 actions.
We call “successful” any action profile in which one player’s action is strictly greater than any
other player’s action. Any other situation corresponds to a “failure.” In common-pool games, we
define the set of desirable action profiles A¯, as the set of successful action profiles, i.e.,
A¯ ,
{
α ∈ A : ∃i ∈ I s.t. αi > max
ℓ 6=i
αℓ
}
. (2.4)
For example, this set of joint actions corresponds to the off-diagonal action profiles in Table 2.2.
Moreover, the set A¯ payoff-dominates the set A \ A¯ .
Claim 2.3. Any common-pool game is a strict coordination game.
Proof. Let A¯ be defined as in (2.4). Note first that for any α∗ ∈ A¯ and α ∈ A \ A¯ , we have
ui(α
∗) > ui(α) for all i ∈ I. In other words, Definition 2.2 (a) is satisfied.
Moreover, note that any α /∈ A¯ is not a Nash equilibrium. For any action profile α /∈ A¯ , pick an
agent i such that i ∈ argmaxs∈I αs. Let us also assume that αi = pj for some j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
If j > 0, then agent i can increase its utility by selecting action pk for any k < j. In that case, the
utility of any other agent either increases or remains the same. If, instead, j = 0, then agent i can
increase its utility by selecting action pk for any k > j. In this case, the utility of any other agent
increases. Thus, Definition 2.2 (b) is also satisfied.
Lastly, note that A∗ ⊆ A¯. To check this, consider any α /∈ A¯. As the previous discussion
revealed, there always exist an agent and a better reply for that agent, i.e., A∗ ⊆ A¯. Thus, Defini-
tion 2.2 (c) is trivially satisfied.
If we imagine that a common-pool game is played repeatedly over time, it would be desirable that
i) failures are avoided, and ii) agents manage to equally share the time they succeed (i.e., access the
common resource). In other words, convergence to a successful state may not be sufficient. Instead,
a (possibly time-dependent) solution that equally divides the time-slots that each user utilizes the
common resource would seem more appropriate.
Distributed convergence to such solutions is currently an open issue in packet radio multiple-
access protocols (see, e.g., [9, Chapter 5]). In these scenarios, there are multiple users that compete
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for access to a single communication channel. Each user needs to decide whether or not to occupy
the channel in a given time-slot based only on local information. If more than one user is occupying
the channel, then a collision occurs and the user needs to resubmit the data. An example of such
multiple-access protocol is the Aloha protocol [1], where users decide on transmitting a packet
according to a probabilistic pattern. In this line of work, the action space of each user consists of
multiple power levels of transmission [26]. If a user transmits with a power level that is strictly
larger than the power level of any other user, then it is able to transmit successfully, otherwise a
collision occurs and transmission is not possible. This game can be formulated in a straightforward
manner as a common-pool game.
In a forthcoming section we provide a distributed solution to this problem using aspiration
learning which is of independent interest.
3. Aspiration Learning. In this section, we define aspiration learning, motivated by [13]. For
some constants ζ > 0, ǫ > 0, λ ≥ 0, c > 0, 0 < h < 1, and ρ, ρ ∈ R, such that
−∞ < ρ < min
α∈A, i∈I
ui(α) ≤ max
α∈A, i∈I
ui(α) < ρ <∞ ,
the aspiration learning iteration initialized at (α(0), ρ(0)) is described in Table 3.1.
According to this algorithm, each agent i keeps track of an aspiration level ρi, which mea-
sures player i’s desirable return and is defined as a perturbed fading memory average of its payoffs
throughout the history of play.
Given the current aspiration level ρi(t), agent i selects a new action αi(t + 1). If the previous
action αi(t) provided utility at least ρi(t), then the agent is “satisfied” and repeats the same action,
i.e., αi(t + 1) = αi(t). Otherwise, αi(t + 1) is selected randomly over all available actions, where
the probability of selecting again αi(t) depends on the level of discontent measured by the difference
ui(α(t)) − ρi(t) < 0. The random variables {ri(t) : t ≥ 0 , i ∈ I} are independent, identically
distributed and are referred to as the “tremble.”
Let X , A × [ρ, ρ]n, i.e., pairs of joint actions α and vectors of aspiration levels, ρi, i ∈ I.
The set A is endowed with the product topology, [ρ, ρ] with its usual Euclidean topology, and
X with the corresponding product topology. We also let B(X ) denote the Borel σ-field of X ,
and P(X ) the set of probability measures on B(X ) endowed with the Prohorov topology, i.e., the
topology of weak convergence. The algorithm in Table 3.1 defines an X -valued Markov chain. Let
Pλ : X ×B(X )→ [0, 1] denote its transition probability function, parameterized by λ > 0. We refer
to the process with λ > 0 as the perturbed process.
We let C(X ) denote the Banach space of real-valued continuous functions on X under the sup-
norm (denoted by ‖ · ‖∞) topology. For f ∈ C(X ) we define
Pλf(x) ,
∫
X
Pλ(x, dy)f(y) and µ[f ] ,
∫
X
µ(dx)f(x) , µ ∈ P(X ) .
It is straightforward to verify that Pλ has the Feller property, i.e., Pλf ∈ C(X ) for all f ∈ C(X ).
Recall that µλ ∈ P(X ) is called an invariant probability measure for Pλ if
(µλPλ)(A) ,
∫
X
µλ(dx)Pλ(x,A) = µλ(A) ∀A ∈ B(X) .
At every t = 0, 1, . . . , and for each i ∈ I
1. Agent i plays αi(t) and measures utility ui(α(t)).
2. Agent i updates its aspiration level according to
ρi(t+ 1) = sat
[
ρi(t) + ǫ[ui(α(t))− ρi(t)] + ri(t)
]
,
where
ri(t) ,


0 , w.p. 1− λ ,
rand[−ζ, ζ] , w.p. λ ,
and
sat[ρ] ,


ρ , if ρ > ρ ,
ρ , if ρ ∈ [ρ, ρ] ,
ρ , if ρ < ρ .
3. Agent i updates its action:
αi(t+ 1) =


αi(t) w.p. φ
(
ui(α(t))− ρi(t)
)
,
rand(Ai \ αi(t)) w.p. 1− φ
(
ui(α(t))− ρi(t)
)
,
where
φ(z) ,


1 , if z ≥ 0 ,
max(h, 1 + cz) , if z < 0 .
4. Agent i updates the time and repeats.
Table 3.1
Aspiration Learning
Since X is a compact metric space and Pλ has the Feller property it admits an invariant probability
measure µλ [10, Theorem 7.2.3].
We are interested in the asymptotic behavior of the aspiration learning algorithm as the “ex-
perimentation probability” λ approaches zero. We say that a state x ∈ X is stochastically stable
if any collection of invariant probability measures {µλ ∈ P(X ) : µλPλ = µλ , λ > 0} satisfies
lim infλ↓0 µλ(x) > 0. It turns out that the stochastically stable states comprise a finite subset of X
which is defined next.
Definition 3.1. A pure strategy state is a state s = (α, ρ) ∈ X such that for all i ∈ I,
ui(α) = ρi. The set of pure strategy states is denoted by S and |S| denotes its cardinality.
Note that the set S is isomorphic to A and can be identified as such.
As customary, the Dirac measure in P(X ) supported at x ∈ X is denoted by δx. The objective in
this section is to characterize the set of stochastically stable states. Our main result is summarized
in the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2. There exists a unique probability vector π = (π1, . . . , π|S|) such that for any
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collection of invariant probability measures {µλ ∈ P(X ) : µλPλ = µλ , λ > 0}, we have
lim
λ↓0
µλ(·) = µˆ(·) ,
∑
s∈S
πsδs(·) ,
where convergence is in the weak∗ sense.
As we show later, π in Theorem 3.2 is the unique invariant distribution of a finite-state Markov
chain.
Remark 3.1. The expected asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning can be characterized by µˆ
and, therefore, π. In particular, by Birkhoff’s individual ergodic theorem, e.g., [10, Theorem 2.3.4],
and the weak convergence of µλ to µˆ, the expected percentage of time that the process spends in any
B ∈ B(X ) such that ∂B ∩ S¯ 6= ∅ is given by µˆ(B) as the experimentation probability λ approaches
zero and time increases, i.e.,
lim
λ↓0
(
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
P kλ (x,B)
)
= µˆ(B) .
The proof of Theorem 3.2 requires a series of propositions, which comprise the remaining of this
section.
Let P (· , ·) denote the transition probability function on X × B(X ) corresponding to λ = 0. We
refer to the process {Xt : t ≥ 0} governed by P as the unperturbed process. Let Ω , X∞ denote the
canonical path space, i.e., an element ω ∈ Ω is a sequence {ω(0), ω(1), . . .}, with ω(t) = (α(t), ρ(t)) ∈
X . We use the same notation for the elements (α, ρ) of the space X and for the coordinates of the
process Xt = (α(t), ρ(t)). Let also Px denote the unique probability measure induced by P on the
product σ-algebra of X∞, initialized at x = (α, ρ), and Ex the corresponding expectation operator.
Let also Ft , σ(Xτ , τ ≤ t) , t ≥ 0, denote the σ-algebra generated by {Xτ , τ ≤ t}.
For t ≥ 0 define the sets
At , {ω ∈ Ω : α(τ) = α(t) , for all τ ≥ t} ,
Bt , {ω ∈ Ω : α(τ) = α(0) , for all 0 ≤ τ ≤ t} .
Note that {Bt : t ≥ 0} is a non-increasing sequence, i.e., Bt+1 ⊆ Bt, while {At : t ≥ 0} is non-
decreasing. Recall that the shift operator θt : Ω → Ω, t ≥ 0, satisfies Xs(θt(ω)) = Xs+t(ω).
Therefore At = θ
−1
t (B∞). Let A∞ ,
⋃∞
t=0At and B∞ ,
⋂∞
t=1Bt. The set A∞ is the event that
agents eventually play the same action profile, while B∞ is the event that agents never change their
actions. For D ∈ B(X ) we let τ(D) denote the first hitting time of D, i.e.,
τ(D) , inf {t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ D} . (3.1)
Proposition 3.3. It holds that
inf
x∈X
Px(B∞) > 0 and inf
x∈X
Px(A∞) = 1 .
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Proof. Assume that the process is initialized at X0 = x = (α, ρ). Note that Bt consists of those
sample paths which satisfy
ρi(τ) = ui(α) − (1− ǫ)
τ
(
ui(α)− ρ
)
, 0 ≤ τ < t , i ∈ I .
Therefore, we have:
Px(Bt) =
∏
0≤τ<t
∏
i∈I
max
{
h, 1− c(1− ǫ)τ
(
ρi − ui(α)
)+}
, (3.2)
where
(x)+ ,

x , if x ≥ 0 ,0 , othewise.
Let T0 satisfy c(1 − ǫ)T0(ρ− ρ) ≤ min {1− h, ǫ} . Then
Px(Bt) ≥ h
nT0
∏
i∈I
∏
T0<τ<t
(
1− c(1− ǫ)τ
(
ρi − ui(α)
)+)
≥ hnT0
∏
i∈I
(
1− c
(
ρi − ui(α)
)+ t∑
τ=T0+1
(1− ǫ)τ
)
≥ hnT0
∏
i∈I
(
1− (1− ǫ)
(
ρi − ui(α)
)+
ρ− ρ
)
∀t > T0 ,
and since the sequence {Bt} is non-increasing, also for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, by continuity from
above, we obtain infx∈X Px(B∞) ≥ ǫnhnT0 , which proves the first claim.
Next, define the set
Dℓ ,
{
(α, ρ) ∈ X : ρi − ui(α) ≤ (1− ǫ)
ℓ
(
ρ− ρ
)
, ∀i ∈ I
}
, ℓ ≥ 0 ,
and note that Px(Bℓ) ≤ P
ℓ(x,Dℓ), where P
t, t ≥ 0, denotes the multistage transition probability
function defined by the recursion P t = P t−1P and P 0 = I. Thus, using the Markov property over
k time blocks of length ℓ, we obtain the rough estimate
Px(τ(Dℓ) > kℓ) ≤ Px(Xjℓ ∈ D
c
ℓ , j = 1, . . . , k)
≤ Px(Xjℓ ∈ D
c
ℓ , j = 1, . . . , k − 1)
(
sup
z∈Dc
ℓ
P ℓ(z,Dcℓ)
)
≤
(
1− inf
z∈X
Pz(Bℓ)
)
Px(Xjℓ ∈ D
c
ℓ , j = 1, . . . , k − 1) . (3.3)
Let q0 , 1− infz∈X Pz(B∞). We have already shown that q0 < 1. Finite induction on (3.3) yields
Px(τ(Dℓ) > kℓ) ≤
(
1− inf
z∈X
Pz(Bℓ)
)k
≤ qk0 .
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We have
Px(Akℓ) ≥
kℓ∑
t=1
Px
(
τ(Dℓ) = t, X ◦ θt ∈ B∞
)
and thus using the Markov property together with the fact that X
τ(Dℓ) ∈ Dℓ a.s. on {τ(Dℓ) <∞},
and setting k = ℓ, we obtain
Px(Aℓ2) ≥
ℓ2∑
t=1
Px
(
τ(Dℓ) = t
)
inf
y∈Dℓ
Py(B∞)
≥
(
1− Px(τ
(
Dℓ) > ℓ
2
))
inf
y∈Dℓ
Py(B∞)
≥
(
1− qℓ0
)
inf
y∈Dℓ
Py(B∞) . (3.4)
It is clear by (3.2) that infx∈Dℓ Px(B∞) → 1 as ℓ → ∞. Therefore both terms on the right hand
side of (3.4) converge to 1 as ℓ→∞, and the proof is complete.
Proposition 3.4. There exists a transition probability function Π on X × P(X ) that has the
Feller property and Π(x, ·) is supported on S for all x ∈ X , and such that
(i) For all f ∈ C(X ), limt→∞ ‖P tf −Πf‖∞ = 0.
(ii) If Rλ is a resolvent of P , defined by
Rλ , ϕ(λ)
∞∑
t=0
(1− ϕ(λ))tP t ,
where ϕ(λ) ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0, and limλ→0 ϕ(λ) = 0, then
lim
λ→0
‖Rλf −Πf‖∞ = 0 ∀f ∈ C(X ) .
Proof. For f ∈ C(X ) and x ∈ X , we have Ex[f(Xt)] = P tf(x). Since At = θ
−1
t (B∞), then using
the Markov property we obtain that, for any positive t and t′,
∣∣P 2tf(x)− P 2t+t′f(x)∣∣ = ∣∣Ex[f(X2t)− f(X2t+t′)]∣∣
=
∣∣Ex[(f(X2t)− f(X2t+t′))1At]∣∣+ ∣∣Ex[(f(X2t)− f(X2t+t′))1Act ]∣∣
≤
∣∣∣Ex[E[(f(X2t)− f(X2t+t′))1At ∣∣ Ft]]∣∣∣+ 2Px(Act )‖f‖∞
≤ Ex
[
EXt
[
|f(X2t)− f(X2t+t′)|1At
]]
+ 2Px(A
c
t )‖f‖∞
≤ sup
z∈X
Ez
[
|f(Xt)− f(Xt+t′)|1B∞
]
+ 2Px(A
c
t)‖f‖∞ . (3.5)
Since for any initial condition x = (α, ρ) the dynamics on B∞ evolve according to
ρ(t) = ̺(t;α, ρ) , u(α)− (1− ǫ)t
(
u(α)− ρ
)
,
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the continuity of f (which is necessarily uniform since X is compact) yields
sup
t′≥0
sup
(α,ρ)∈X
E(α,ρ)
[
|f(Xt)− f(Xt+t′)|1B∞
]
= sup
t′≥0
sup
(α,ρ)∈X
∣∣f(α, ̺(t;α, ρ))− f(α, ̺(t+ t′;α, ρ))∣∣ −−−→
t→∞
0 . (3.6)
By (3.5)–(3.6) and Proposition 3.3 we obtain
sup
t′>0
‖P 2tf − P 2t+t
′
f‖∞ −−−→t→∞
0 .
Therefore, the sequence {P tf , t ∈ N} is Cauchy in
(
C(X ), ‖ · ‖∞
)
, and hence converges in C(X ).
Let ϕ(f)(x) , limt→∞ P
tf(x). Then for each x, f 7→ ϕ(f)(x) defines a bounded linear functional
on C(X ). It is a positive functional since ϕ(f)(x) ≥ 0, for f ≥ 0, and if 1 denotes the constant
function equal to 1, ϕ(1)(x) = 1. Then, by the Riesz representation theorem, ϕ(f)(x) is a Borel
probability measure on X for each x. Denote this by Π(x, ·). Since ϕ : C(X )→ C(X ), it follows that
Π has the Feller property. Also, by the definition of Π, we have
‖P tf −Πf‖∞ −−−→t→∞
0 ∀f ∈ C(X ) . (3.7)
This proves (i).
Next using a triangle inequality, we have for each T > 0,
‖Rλf −Πf‖∞ ≤ ϕ(λ)
T−1∑
t=0
(1− ϕ(λ))t‖P tf −Πf‖∞ + (1− ϕ(λ))
T sup
t≥T
‖P tf −Πf‖∞ .
Letting λ ↓ 0, we obtain
‖Rλf −Πf‖∞ ≤ sup
t≥T
‖P tf −Πf‖∞ ∀T > 0 ,
and (ii) follows by (3.7).
We can decompose the transition probability function of the perturbed process as
Pλ = (1− ϕ(λ))P + ϕ(λ)Qλ , ϕ(λ) , 1− (1 − λ)
n , (3.8)
where ϕ(λ) is the probability that at least one agent trembles, and satisfies ϕ(λ) ↓ 0 as λ ↓ 0. Also,
define the “lifted” transition probability function:
PLλ , ϕ(λ)
∞∑
t=0
(1− ϕ(λ))tQλP
t = QλRλ ,
where Rλ was defined in Proposition 3.4 (the equality on the right-hand side is evident by Fubini).
Similarly we decompose Qλ as
Qλ = (1− ψ(λ))Q + ψ(λ)Q
∗ , ψ(λ) , 1−
nλ(1− λ)n−1
1− (1− λ)n
.
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Here Q is the transition probability function induced by aspiration learning where exactly one
player trembles, and Q∗ is the transition probability function where at least two players tremble
simultaneously.
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. The following hold,
(i) For f ∈ C(X ), limλ→0 ‖PLλ f −QΠf‖∞ = 0.
(ii) Any invariant distribution µλ of Pλ is also an invariant distribution of P
L
λ .
(iii) Any weak limit point in P(X ) of µλ, as λ ↓ 0, is an invariant probability measure of QΠ.
Proof. (i) We have
‖PLλ f −QΠf‖∞ ≤ ‖Qλ(Rλf −Πf)‖∞ + ‖QλΠf −QΠf‖∞
≤ ‖Rλf −Πf‖∞ + ‖QλΠf −QΠf‖∞ . (3.9)
The first term on the right hand side of (3.9) tends to 0 as λ ↓ 0 by Proposition 3.4, while the second
term does the same by the definition of Qλ.
(ii) Multiplying both sides of (3.8) by Rλ, we have
PλRλ = Rλ − ϕ(λ)I + ϕ(λ)P
L
λ , (3.10)
where I denotes the identity operator. Let µλ denote an invariant distribution of Pλ. Hence, by
(3.10), we have
µλRλ = µλRλ − ϕ(λ)µλ + ϕ(λ)µλP
L
λ ,
and the second claim follows.
(iii) Let µˆ be a limit point of µλ as λ ↓ 0. For any f ∈ C(X ), we have
µˆ[f ]− (µˆQΠ)[f ] =
(
µˆ[f ]− µλ[f ]
)
+ µλ
[
PLλ f −QΠf
]
+
(
µλ
[
QΠf
]
− µˆ
[
QΠf
])
.
The first and the third terms on the right hand side tend to 0 as λ ↓ 0 along some sequence, by
the weak convergence µλ to µˆ, while the second term is dominated by ‖PLλ [f ]−QΠ[f ]‖∞ that also
tends to 0 by part (i).
For s ∈ S let Nε(s) denote the open ε-neighborhood of s in X . For any two pure strategy states,
s, s′ ∈ S, define
Pˆss′ , lim
t→∞
QP t(s,Nε(s
′))
for some ε > 0 sufficiently small. By Proposition 3.3, Pˆss′ is independent of the selection of ε. Define
also the |S| × |S| stochastic matrix Pˆ , [Pˆss′ ].
Proposition 3.6. There exists a unique invariant probability measure µˆ of QΠ. It satisfies
µˆ(·) =
∑
s∈S
πsδs(·) (3.11)
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for some constants πs ≥ 0, s ∈ S. Moreover, π = (π1, . . . , π|S|) is an invariant distribution of Pˆ ,
i.e., π = πPˆ .
Proof. By Proposition 3.4, the support of Π is S, and so is the support of QΠ. Thus, for any
sufficiently small ε > 0, QΠ(s, s′) = QΠ(s,Nε(s
′)) . Since QΠ is a Feller transition function it admits
an invariant probability measure, say µˆ. The support of µˆ is also S, and, therefore, it has the form
of (3.11) for some constants πs ≥ 0, s ∈ S.
Note also that Nε(s
′) is a continuity set of QΠ(s, ·), i.e., QΠ(s, ∂Nε(s′)) = 0. Therefore, by the
Portmanteau theorem,
QΠ(s,Nε(s
′)) = lim
t→∞
QP t(s,Nε(s
′)) = Pˆss′ .
If we also define πs , µˆ(Nε(s)), then
πs′ = µˆ(Nε(s
′)) =
∑
s∈S
πsQΠ(s,Nε(s
′)) =
∑
s∈S
πsPˆss′ ,
which shows that π is an invariant distribution of Pˆ , i.e., π = πPˆ .
To establish the uniqueness of the invariant distribution of QΠ, recall the definition of Q. Since
S is isomorphic with A, we can identify s ∈ S with an element α ∈ A. If agent i trembles, then
all actions in Ai have positive probability of being selected, i.e., Q(α, (α′i, α−i)) > 0 for all α
′
i ∈ Ai
and i ∈ I. It follows by Proposition 3.3 that QΠ(α, (α′i, α−i)) > 0 for all α
′
i ∈ Ai and i ∈ I. Finite
induction then shows that (QΠ)n(α, α′) > 0 for all α, α′ ∈ A. It follows that if we restrict the
domain of QΠ to S, then QΠ defines an irreducible stochastic matrix. Therefore, QΠ has a unique
invariant distribution.
Theorem 3.2 follows from Propositions 3.5 and 3.6. Moreover, Proposition 3.6 shows that the
unique invariant probability measure of QΠ agrees with the unique invariant probability distribution
of the finite stochastic matrix Pˆ .
Remark 3.2. A similar result to Proposition 3.5(i), based on which Theorem 3.2 was shown,
has also been derived in [13, Theorem 2]. The result in [13] though assumes incorrectly that the
process Q satisfies the strong Feller property. Note that the proof of Proposition 3.5 does not make
use of any such assumption and provides a corrected analysis for the asymptotic behavior of the
aspiration learning scheme presented in [13].
In the forthcoming sections, we demonstrate the importance of Theorem 3.2 in characterizing
the asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning in large coordination games. Note that prior analysis
of this type of aspiration learning, e.g., in [5, 13], was only restricted to two player and two action
games.
4. Efficiency in Coordination Games. In this section, we study the asymptotic behavior
of the invariant distribution π of Pˆ in strict coordination games when the step size ǫ approaches
zero. The aim is to characterize the states in S that are stochastically stable with respect to the
parameter ǫ. To this end, first denote S¯ as the set of pure strategy states that correspond to A¯.
Clearly, S¯ is isomorphic to A¯. Also, denote by S∗ the set of pure strategy states that correspond to
the set of Nash action profiles A∗.
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We define two constants that are important in the analysis:
∆min , min
i∈I
min
α∈A¯ ,α′ /∈A¯
{
ui(α)− ui(α
′)
}
∆max , max
i∈I
max
α6=α′
|ui(α
′)− ui(α)| .
For strict coordination games ∆min > 0, and it is the smallest possible payoff decrease from the
dominant payoff due to any deviation from the set of actions in A¯.
To facilitate the analysis we let P˜x and E˜x denote the probability and expectation operator,
respectively, on the path space of a Markov process Xt starting at x ∈ X at t = 0, and governed by
the family of transition probabilities {QP t : t ≥ 0}. In other words P˜x(Xt ∈ A) = QP t−1(x,A) for
any A ∈ B(X ).
4.1. Two Technical Lemmas. Lemma 4.1 below introduces two new hypotheses. The first
hypothesis corresponds to the case at which payoff differences within the same action profile are
smaller than payoff differences between dominant and non-dominant action profiles. The second
hypothesis corresponds to the case where each player receives a unique payoff within A¯.
Lemma 4.1. Let G be a strict coordination game satisfying either one of the following two
hypotheses:
(H1) δ∗ , maxi6=j maxα∈A |ui(α)− uj(α)| < ∆min.
(H2) A¯ ≡ {α¯ ∈ A : ui(α¯) = maxα∈A ui(α) ∀i ∈ I} .
Then, there exists a constant C0 = C0(δ
∗,∆min,∆max) such that if ζ < C0 then
Pˆs¯s −−→
ε↓0
0 for all s¯ ∈ S¯ , s ∈ S \ S¯ .
Proof. Suppose (H1) holds. Select ζ < 12 (∆min − δ
∗). Let x(0) = s¯ ≡ (α¯, ρ¯) ∈ S¯. Without loss
of generality suppose agent 1 trembles. If r1(0) < 0 the process clearly converges to s¯ as t → ∞
with probability 1. Therefore, suppose r1(0) > 0. Note that for t ≥ 0 we have
|ρi(t+ 1)− ρj(t+ 1)| ≤ (1− ǫ)|ρi(t)− ρj(t)|+ ǫ|ui(α(t)) − uj(α(t))|
≤ (1− ǫ)|ρi(t)− ρj(t)|+ ǫδ
∗ for all i, j ∈ I , (4.1)
and since ζ < 12 (∆min − δ
∗) by a straightforward induction argument using (4.1) we obtain
max
i,j∈I
|ρi(t)− ρj(t)| ≤
∆min + δ
∗
2
∀t ≥ 0 . (4.2)
For i ∈ I define
ρ˘i , min
α¯∈A¯
ui(α¯) and ρˆi , max
α∈A\A¯
ui(α) ,
and for k = 0, 1 define the sets
Dk ,
{
(α, ρ) ∈ X : ρi ≤
ρ˘i + (2k + 1)ρˆi
2k + 2
+
∆min + δ
∗
4
, i ∈ I
}
.
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Let also
Γ ,
{
(α, ρ) ∈ X : min(ρ˘i − ρi, ρi − ρˆi) ≥
1
4
(∆min − δ
∗) , i ∈ I
}
,
and
Γ¯ ,
{
(α, ρ) ∈ Γ : α ∈ A¯
}
.
Recall the definition of τ in (3.1) and in order to simplify the notation let τk , τ(Dk), for k = 0, 1.
Note the following: Firstly, using (4.2), we obtain
Γ ⊂ D0 \D1 . (4.3)
Secondly, since |ρi(t+ 1)− ρi(t)| ≤ ǫ∆max, we obtain(
τ1 − τ0 −
∆min
4ǫ∆max
)
1{τ0<∞} ≥ 0 P˜s¯-a.s. (4.4)
It is also evident that {
lim sup
t→∞
dS(Xt,S \ S¯) = 0
}
⊂ {τ1 <∞} P˜s¯-a.s. , (4.5)
where dS is a metric in S. It is clear from the definition of P that if x ∈ Γ there are two possibilities:
If a profile α ∈ A \ A¯ is played, then ρi decreases in value for all i ∈ I, or in other words, that
P (x,Γ) = 1 for all x ∈ (Γ∩Dc1) \ Γ¯. Otherwise, if a profile in A¯ is played, then the sample path gets
trapped in the domain of attraction of S¯. This means that if x ∈ Γ¯ then Px(τ1 < ∞) = 0, where
Px is the probability measure induced by P defined in Section 3. In this case, and by (4.3), we also
have
P (x, Γ¯) ≥ min
{ c
4
(∆min − δ
∗), 1− h
}
, γ ∀x ∈ Γ ∩Dc1 .
Thus, using the Markov property we obtain, with t0 ,
⌊
∆min
4ǫ∆max
⌋
,
P t0(x,Γ \ Γ¯) ≤ (1− γ)t0 ∀x ∈ Γ ∩Dc1 . (4.6)
Conditioning on Fτ0 and using the strong Markov property, (4.4), (4.6) and the foregoing, we obtain
P˜s¯(τ1 <∞) ≤ E˜s¯
[
E˜s¯
[
1{τ1<∞} | Fτ0
]]
≤ E˜s¯
[
PXτ0 (τ1 <∞)
]
≤ sup
x∈Γ∩Dc1
Px(τ1 <∞)
≤ sup
x∈Γ∩Dc1
P t0(x,Γ \ Γ¯)
≤ exp
(⌊
∆min
4ǫ∆max
⌋
log(1 − γ)
)
. (4.7)
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The result then follows by (4.5) and (4.7).
Next, suppose (H2) holds. Note that in this case ρ˘i ≡ ui(α¯) for all α¯ ∈ A¯ . Pick any ζ <
∆2min
4∆max
.
As before we may suppose that agent 1 trembles. Let N∗(ǫ) , ⌊ζ/ǫ∆min⌋. Let τ˘ be the first time
that an action profile in A\ A¯ has been played at least N∗(ǫ) times. Then, at time τ˘ the aspiration
level of the initially perturbed agent 1 satisfies:
ρ1(τ˘) ≤ ρ˘1 + ζ − ǫ∆minN
∗(ǫ) ≤ ρ˘1 ,
while the aspiration level of any agent i ∈ I satisfies
ρi(τ˘) ≥ ρ˘i − ǫ∆max
⌊
ζ
ǫ∆min
⌋
≥ ρ˘i − ǫ∆max
ζ
ǫ∆min
> ρ˘i −
∆min
4
.
For k = 0, 1 define the sets
D˜k ,
{
(α, ρ) ∈ X : ρi ≤
ρ˘i + (2k + 1)ρˆi
2k + 2
, i ∈ I
}
,
and let τ˜k , τ(D˜k), for k = 0, 1. Also define
Γ˜ ,
{
(α, ρ) ∈ X : ρi ≤ ρ˘i −
∆2min
4∆max
, i ∈ I
}
.
It is straightforward to show that P˜s¯(Xτ˜0 ∈ Γ˜) = 1. From this point on, we proceed as in the
previous case.
For the lemma that follows we need to define the following constant. For each α∗ ∈ A∗ \ A¯,
select any α˜ ∈ A and {j1, . . . , jn−1} ⊂ I which satisfy Definition 2.2 (c), and define
∆0 ,
1
2
min
α∗∈A∗\A¯
min
1≤ℓ≤n−1
min
i∈{j1,...,jℓ+1}
{
ui(α
∗)− ui
(
α˜j1 , . . . , α˜jℓ , α
∗
−{j1,...,jℓ}
)}
.
By Definition 2.2 (c), ∆0 > 0.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose
ǫ <
∆0 ∧∆min
n∆max
. (4.8)
Then, for any strict coordination game G for which A∗ \ A¯ 6= ∅, there exists a constant M0 =
M0(h, |A|) > 0 such that
Pˆs∗s¯ ≥
M0
c ζ ∧ (1− h)
for all s∗ ∈ S∗ \ S¯ , s¯ ∈ S¯ .
Proof. Let s∗ = (α∗, ρ∗) ∈ S∗ \ S¯, s¯ = (α¯, ρ¯) ∈ S¯. Suppose α˜ ∈ A and {j1, . . . , jn−1} ⊂ I are
the action profile and sequence of agents, respectively, corresponding to α∗ used in the calculation
of ∆0. Consider the sample paths s(t) =
(
α(t), ρ(t)
)
satisfying s(0) = s∗, ρj1(1) ∈ (ρ
∗
j1 , ρ
∗
j1 + ζ),
ρ−j1(1) = ρ
∗
−j1
, and α(t) =
(
α˜j1 , . . . , α˜jt , α
∗
−{j1,...,jt}
)
, for 0 < t < n. We have
Q
(
s(0), s(1)
)
≥
1
2n
(
c ζ ∧ (1 − h)
)
|Aj1 |
. (4.9)
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By (4.8), ρ∗i − ρi(t) ≤ ∆0 for all i ∈ I and t ≤ n. Therefore,
ρi(t)− ui(α(t)) ≥ ∆0 for all i ∈ {j1, . . . , jt+1} ,
for 0 ≤ t < n and hence we obtain
P
(
s(t− 1), s(t)
)
≥ hn−1
(
c∆0 ∧ (1− h)
)
|Ajt+1 |
, 1 < t < n , (4.10)
and
P
(
s(n− 1), s¯
)
≥
(
c∆0 ∧ (1 − h)
)n
|A|
. (4.11)
By (4.8), we have
ρ¯i − ρi(n) ≥ ∆min + ρ
∗
i − ρi(n) > 0 ∀i ∈ I . (4.12)
By (4.12), Π
(
s(n− 1), s¯
)
≥ P
(
s(n− 1), s¯
)
. Consequently, the result follows by (4.9)–(4.11).
4.2. Main Result. We define inductively the following collection of sets
Sk ,

s = (α, ρ) ∈
k−1⋃
j=0
(Sj)
c : ∃i ∈ I, α′i ∈ BRi(α) satisfying (2.2) and (α
′
i, α−i) ∈ Sk−1


for S0 = S∗ ∪ S¯. For example, S1 includes all pure strategy states for which there exist an agent
i and an action α′i ∈ BRi(α) which satisfies (2.2) (i.e., makes no other player worse off) and also
α′ = (α′i, α−i) ∈ S0. Let also K denote the maximum k for which Sk is non-empty, i.e., K ,
max {k ∈ N : Sk 6= ∅} . Such K is well-defined since the set of action profiles A is finite.
Lemma 4.3. In any coordination game, the collection of sets {Sk}Kk=0 forms a partition of S.
Proof. By definition of the collection {Sk}Kk=0, the sets Sk are mutually disjoint. It remains
to show that their union coincides with S. Assume not, i.e., assume that there exists s ∈ S such
that s = (α, ρ) /∈
⋃K
k=1 Sk. According to the definition of a coordination game and Claim 2.1, there
exists a sequence of action profiles {αj}, such that α0 = α and αj = BRi(αj−1) for some i ∈ I
terminates in A∗ ∪ A¯. Let {sj} denote the sequence of pure strategy states which corresponds to
{αj}. Then, for some j∗ we have sj
∗
∈ S∗ ∪ S¯, i.e., sj
∗
∈ S0. Since sj
∗
∈ S0, then we should also
have that sj
∗−1 ∈ S1, . . . , s
0 = s ∈ Sj∗ . However, this conclusion contradicts our assumption that
s /∈
⋃K
k=1 Sk. Thus,
⋃K
k=1 Sk = S and therefore the collection of sets {Sk}
K
k=0 defines a partition for
S.
Theorem 4.4. Let G be a strict coordination game that satisfies either one of the hypotheses
(H1) or (H2) in Lemma 4.1, and suppose that ζ < C0. Then πsi → 0 as ǫ ↓ 0 for all si /∈ S¯.
Proof. Consider the partition of S defined by the family of sets {Sk}Kk=0. Let PˆSiSj denote the
sub-stochastic matrix composed of the transition probabilities Pˆsisj for si ∈ Si and sj ∈ Sj . In
other words
[
PˆSiSj
]
is the block decomposition of Pˆ subordinate to the partition {S0,S1 . . . ,SK}.
Similarly, we define S˜∗ , S∗ \ S¯, and let (
PˆS¯S¯ PˆS¯S˜∗
PˆS˜∗S¯ PˆS˜∗S˜∗
)
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denote the block decomposition of PˆS0S0 subordinate to the partition (S¯, S˜
∗) of S0. From:
πS¯ = πS¯ PˆS¯S¯ + πS¯c PˆS¯cS¯ ,
we obtain
πS¯(I − PˆS¯S¯) = πS¯ PˆS¯S¯c = πS¯c PˆS¯cS¯ .
By Lemma 4.1, PˆS¯S¯c → 0 as ǫ → 0, while by Lemma 4.2 for some positive constant δ˜, which does
not depend on ǫ, we have PˆS˜∗S¯1 ≥ δ˜1. Thus,
δ˜ πS˜∗1 ≤ πS˜∗ PˆS˜∗S¯1 ≤ πS¯ PˆS¯S¯c1 = πS¯c PˆS¯cS¯1 −−−→ǫ→0
0 ,
and we obtain
πS˜∗ → 0 as ǫ→ 0 . (4.13)
Similarly, from the equation πS0 = πS0 PˆS0S0 + πSc0 PˆSc0S0 , we obtain πS0 PˆS0Sc01 = πSc0 PˆSc0S01. It is
straightforward to show, using Definition 2.2 (b), that for some positive constant δˆ, which does not
depend on ǫ, we have PˆSkSk+11 ≥ δˆ1 for all k ≥ 0. Combining the equations above we get:
δˆ πS01 ≤ πS0 PˆS0S11 ≤ πS0 PˆS0Sc01
= πSc0 PˆSc0S01
= πS¯ PˆS¯S01+ πS˜∗ PˆS˜∗S01 −−−→ǫ→0
0 ,
where in the last line we used Lemma 4.1 and (4.13). Thus, we have shown that πS0 → 0 as ǫ→ 0.
We proceed by induction. Suppose πSk → 0 as ǫ→ 0. Then,
δˆ πSk+11 ≤ πSk+1 PˆSk+1Sk1 ≤ πSk1 −−−→
ǫ→0
0 ,
which shows that πSk+1 → 0 as ǫ→ 0. By Lemma 4.3, the proof is complete.
Theorem 4.4 combined with Theorem 3.2 provides a complete characterization of the time av-
erage asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning in strict coordination games.
4.3. Simulations in Network Formation Games. In this section, we demonstrate the
asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning in coordination games as described by Theorems 3.2–4.4.
Consider the network formation game of Section 2.2 which, according to Claim 2.2, is a (non-strict)
coordination game. Although Theorem 4.4 was only shown for strict coordination games, our in-
tention here is to demonstrate that it also applies to the larger class of (non-strict) coordination
games.
We consider a set of six nodes deployed on the plane, so that the neighbors of each node are the
two immediate nodes (e.g., N1 = {2, 6}). Note that a payoff-dominant set of networks exists and
corresponds to the wheel networks, where each node has a single link. We pick the set A¯ of desirable
networks as the set of wheel networks. Note that the set A¯ satisfies hypothesis (H2) of Lemma 4.1.
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Fig. 4.1. A typical response of aspiration learning in the network formation game.
In order for the average behavior to be observed λ and ǫ need to be sufficiently small. We
choose: h = 0.01, c = 0.2, ζ = 0.01, ǫ = λ = 10e − 4, and c = 1/8. In Fig. 4.1, we have plotted a
typical response of aspiration learning for this setup, where the final graph and the aspiration level
as a function of time are shown.
To illustrate better the response of aspiration learning, define the distance from node j to node
i, denoted distG(j, i), as the minimum number of hops from j to i. We also adopt the convention
distG(i, i) = 0 and distG(j, i) = ∞ if there is no path from j to i in G. The last graph in Fig. 4.1
plots, for each node, the running average of the inverse total distance from all other nodes, i.e.,
1/
∑
j∈I
distG(j,i). This number is zero if the node is disconnected from any other node.
We observe that the payoff-dominant profile (wheel network) is played with frequency that
approaches one. In fact, the aspiration level converges to (n− 1) − c = 4.875 and the inverse total
distance converges to 1/15 ≈ 0.067, both of which correspond to the wheel network.
5. Fairness in Symmetric and Coordination Games. In several coordination games, es-
tablishing convergence (in the way defined by Theorem 3.2) to the set of desirable states S¯ (as
Theorem 4.4 showed) may not be sufficient. For example, in common-pool games of Section 2.3,
convergence to S¯ does not guarantee that all agents get access to the common resource in a fair
schedule. In the remainder of this section, we establish conditions under which fairness is also
established.
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5.1. A Property of Finite Markov Chains. In this section, we provide an approach on
characterizing explicitly the invariant distribution of a finite-state, irreducible and aperiodic Markov
chain. We use a characterization introduced by [7], which has been extensively used for showing
stochastic stability arguments for several learning dynamics, see, e.g., [18,28]. In particular, for finite
Markov chains an invariant distribution can be expressed as the ratio of sums of products consisting
of transition probabilities. These products can be described conveniently by means of graphs on the
set of states of the chain.
Let S be a finite set of states, whose elements are denoted by sk, sℓ, etc., and let a subset W of
S.
Definition 5.1. (W-graph) A graph consisting of arrows sk → sℓ (sk ∈ S \W , sℓ ∈ S, sℓ 6= sk)
is called a W-graph if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. every point k ∈ S \W is the initial point of exactly one arrow;
2. there are no closed cycles in the graph; or, equivalently, for any point sk ∈ S \W there
exists a sequence of arrows leading from it to some point sℓ ∈ W.
We denote by G{W} the set of W-graphs; we shall use the letter g to denote graphs.
If Pˆsksℓ are nonnegative numbers, where sk, sℓ ∈ S, define the product
̟(g) ,
∏
(sk→sℓ)∈g
Pˆsksℓ .
The following Lemma holds:
Lemma 5.2 (Lemma 6.3.1 in [7]). Let us consider a Markov chain with a finite set of states S
and transition probabilities {Pˆsksℓ} and assume that every state can be reached from any other state
in a finite number of steps. Then the stationary distribution of the chain is π = [πs], where
πs =
Rs∑
si∈S
Rsi
, s ∈ S
and Rs ,
∑
g∈G{s}̟(g).
5.2. Fairness in Symmetric Games. In this section, using Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 5.2 we
establish fairness in symmetric games, defined as follows:
Definition 5.3 (Symmetric game). A game G characterized by the action profile set A is
symmetric if, for any two agents i, j ∈ I and any action profile α ∈ A, the following hold: a) if
αi = αj, then ui(α) = uj(α), and b) if αi 6= αj, then there exists an action profile α′ ∈ A \ {α},
such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. α′i = αj , αi = α
′
j and α
′
k = αk for all k 6= i, j;
2. ui(α
′) = uj(α), ui(α) = uj(α
′) and uk(α
′) = uk(α) for any k 6= i, j.
Define the following equivalence relation between states in S:
Definition 5.4 (State equivalence). For any two pure-strategy states s, s′ ∈ S such that s 6= s′,
let α and α′ denote the corresponding action profiles. We write s ∼ s′ if there exist i, j ∈ I, i 6= j,
such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. α′i = αj , αi = α
′
j and α
′
k = αk for all k 6= i, j;
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2. ui(α
′) = uj(α), ui(α) = uj(α
′) and uk(α
′) = uk(α) for any k 6= i, j.
Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between S and A, we also say that two action profiles
α and α′ are equivalent, if the conditions of Definition 5.4 are satisfied.
Lemma 5.5. For any symmetric game and for any two pure-strategy states s, s′ ∈ S such that
s ∼ s′, πs = πs′ .
Proof. Let us consider any two pure strategy states s, s′ ∈ S such that s ∼ s′. Let also consider
any {s}-graph g, i.e., g ∈ G{s}. Such a graph can be identified as a collection of paths, i.e., for some
M ≥ 1, we have g =
⋃M
m=1 gm , where
gm =
L(m)−1⋃
ℓ=1
(
sκm(ℓ) → sκm(ℓ+1)
)
for some L(m) ≥ 1. In the above expression, the function κm provides an enumeration of the states
that belong to the path gm. Note that due to the definition of G{s}-graphs, we should have that
sκm(L(m)) = s for all m = 1, . . . ,M . Moreover, if M > 1, we should also have
M⋂
m=1
{
sκm(1), . . . , sκm(L(m)−1)
}
= ∅ ,
i.e., the collection of paths {gm} do not cross each other, except at node s.
Let us consider any other state s′ ∈ S such that s′ ∼ s. Since the game is symmetric, for any
graph g ∈ G{s}, there exists a unique graph g′ ∈ G{s′} which satisfies g′ =
⋃M
m=1 g
′
m , where
g′m =
L(m)−1⋃
ℓ=1
(
s′κm(ℓ) → s
′
κm(ℓ+1)
)
and sκm(ℓ) ∼ s
′
κm(ℓ)
, ℓ = 1, . . . , L(m), for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
The transition probability between any two states is a sum of probabilities of sequences of
action profiles. Since the game is symmetric, for any such sequence of action profiles which leads,
for instance, from sκm(ℓ) to sκm(ℓ+1), there exists an equivalent sequence of action profiles which
leads from s′κm(ℓ) to s
′
κm(ℓ+1)
. Therefore, we should have that:
Pˆsκm(ℓ)sκm(ℓ+1) = Pˆs′κm(ℓ)s
′
κm(ℓ+1)
for any m = 1, . . . ,M , and hence, ̟(g′) = ̟(g) . In other words, there exists an isomorphism
between the graphs in the sets G{s} and G{s′}, such that any two isomorphic graphs have the same
transition probability. Thus, we have πs = π
′
s for any two states s, s
′ such that s ∼ s′.
Lemma 5.5 can be used to provide a more explicit characterization of the invariant distribution
π in several classes of coordination games which are also symmetric, e.g., common-pool games.
5.3. Fairness in Common-Pool Games. First, recall that in common-pool games we define
the set of “desirable” or “successful” action profiles A¯ as in (2.4). To characterize more explicitly
the invariant distribution π, we define the subset of pure-strategy states S¯i that correspond to
“successful” states for agent i by
S¯i , {s ∈ S : αi > αj , ∀j 6= i} .
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In other words, S¯i corresponds to the set of pure-strategy states in which the action of agent i is
strictly larger than the action of any other agent j 6= i. We also define S¯ ,
⋃
i∈I S¯i.
Note that the equivalence relation ∼ defines an isomorphism among the states of any two sets
S¯i and S¯j for any i 6= j. This is due to the fact that for any state si ∈ S¯i, there exists a unique state
sj ∈ S¯j such that si ∼ sj .
Lemma 5.6. For any common-pool game, πS¯1 = · · · = πS¯n .
Proof. As already mentioned, for any i, j ∈ I such that i 6= j and for any state si ∈ S¯i, there
exists a unique state sj ∈ S¯j such that sj ∼ si. Therefore, the sets S¯i and S¯j are isomorphic with
respect to the equivalence relation ∼. Since a common-pool game is symmetric, from Lemma 5.5,
we conclude that πS¯1 = · · · = πS¯n .
Theorem 5.7. Let G be a common-pool game which satisfies hypothesis (H1) of Lemma 4.1.
There exists a constant C0 > 0 such that for any ζ < C0, πS¯i −−→ǫ↓0
1
n , for all i ∈ I .
Proof. First, recognize that the sets {S¯i} are mutually disjoint, and
⋃n
i=1 S¯i = S¯ . Then, by
Theorem 4.4, and for any ζ < 12 (∆min − δ
∗), we have πS¯ =
∑n
i=1 πS¯i → 1 as ǫ → 0 . Lastly, by
Lemma 5.6, the conclusion follows.
In other words, we have shown that the invariant distribution π puts equal weight on either
agent “succeeding,” which establishes a form of fairness over time. Moreover, it puts zero weight
on states outside S¯ (i.e., states which correspond to collisions) as ǫ→ 0.
5.4. Simulations in Common-Pool Games. Theorems 3.2 and 5.7 provide a characteriza-
tion of the asymptotic behavior of aspiration learning in common-pool games as λ and ǫ approach
zero. In fact, according to Remark 3.1, the expected percentage of time that the aspiration learning
spends in any one of the pure strategy sets S¯i should be equal as the perturbation probability λ→ 0
and t→∞ (i.e., fairness is established). Moreover, the expected percentage of “failures” (i.e., states
outside S¯) approaches zero as t→∞.
We consider the following setup for aspiration learning: λ = 0.001, ǫ = 0.001, h = 0.01,
c = 0.05, and ζ = 0.05 . Also, we consider a common-pool game of 2 players and 4 actions, where
c0 = 0, c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.2, c3 = 0.3 and τ0 = τ1 = τ2 = τ3 = 0.8. Note that the maximum payoff
difference within the same action profile is δ∗ = 0.1, and the minimum payoff difference between
A¯ and A \ A¯ is ∆min = 0.6. Therefore, the hypotheses of Theorem 5.7 are clearly satisfied since
δ∗ < ∆min and ζ <
1
2 (∆min− δ
∗). Under this setup, Fig. 5.1 demonstrates the response of aspiration
learning. We observe, as Theorem 5.7 predicts, that the frequency with which either agent succeeds
approaches 1/2 as time increases. Also, the frequency of collisions (i.e., the joint actions in which
neither agent succeeds) approaches zero as time increases.
6. Conclusions. We introduced an aspiration learning algorithm and analyzed its asymptotic
behavior in games of multiple players and actions. The main contribution of this analysis was the
establishment of a relation between the time average behavior of the induced infinite-state Markov
chain with the invariant distribution of a finite-state Markov chain. The establishment of this
relation allowed for characterizing the asymptotic properties of aspiration learning when applied to
generic coordination games. In particular, we showed that over time, the efficient payoff profiles are
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Fig. 5.1. A typical response of aspiration learning in a common-pool game with 2 players and 4 actions.
played (in expectation) with a frequency that can become arbitrarily large. This analysis extended
(and corrected) prior results on aspiration learning which primarily focused on games of two players
and two actions. We further demonstrated these results through simulations on network formation
games, where distributed convergence to efficient networks is of particular interest. Finally, we
provided conditions under which fair outcomes can be established in symmetric coordination games
where coincidence of interest among players is not so strong. For example, we showed that in
common-pool games, where multiple players compete over utilizing a limited resource, the expected
frequency at which the common resource is exploited successfully is equally divided among players
as time increases, which establishes a form of fairness.
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